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1 
Zero and the Rise of 
Technological Lawmaking 
 
Max Stul Oppenheimer* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
If a tree falls in Cambridge, Massachusetts and there is no 
one nearby to hear it, but it is detected by a supersensitive 
monitor near a hospital in Princeton, New Jersey, does it make 
a sound? If so, does that sound violate a Princeton ordinance 
that prohibits making a “detectable sound” in a hospital zone? 
The interpretation of such an ordinance is committed to 
the judiciary; the creation of new laws is committed to the 
legislature and the judiciary. Although there is legislative 
power to delegate certain aspects of this authority, it is 
circumscribed, both by the Constitution and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”). 
A third mechanism for changing law emerged without 
fanfare in the middle of the twentieth century and has taken 
on increasing importance as the pace of technological 
development accelerates: advances in technology may change 
the meaning of a law even though the words of a statute 
remain unchanged. A vehicle law which limits vehicle speeds to 
miles per hour (“mph”) depends on the definitions of miles and 
of hour, both of which have undergone change since the first 
vehicle speed limits were adopted in the early twentieth 
century. An environmental law which limits “detectible 
emissions” depends on the sensitivity of available detection 
equipment, a characteristic which has changed since the first 
modern environmental laws were adopted in the mid-twentieth 
century. 
This technological development is not overseen by any 
government entity, yet it has the consequence of redefining the 
 
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; B. S. Princeton 
University, J. D. Harvard Law School. 
1
  
2 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
meaning of existing laws. Although such changes in the 
meaning of a statute can have a profound economic impact, 
legislatures rarely consider it. 
This Article examines the question of when this is 
problematic. It begins by identifying and drawing the outline of 
this previously unrecognized source of law: technology-made 
law. It then focuses on one paradigmatic case: changes in the 
meaning of “zero” and the closely related concept of a 
mathematical limit (for example a speed limit). It defines “zero” 
and demonstrates its explicit and implicit uses in law. It then 
posits that there are two ways to interpret a law involving a 
technological limit: a technology-static approach, in which 
comparisons are made using the technology available at the 
time the law was enacted, and a technology-dynamic approach, 
in which comparisons are made using the technology available 
at the time compliance is determined. It then sets the stage for 
a comparison of these approaches by surveying the sources of 
authority for making law. The approaches are then compared 
using examples of the type of law which should be interpreted 
under the technology-static rubric (vehicle speed limits) and 
the type of law which should be interpreted under the 
technology-dynamic rubric (environmental law). The analyses 
are then compared so as to extract a set of principles that 
should aid in resolution of the question (static or dynamic 
interpretation) in other cases. Finally, it offers a generalized 
theory of how problems of technology-made law can be 
minimized and how they should be addressed in circumstances 
where they have not been avoided. 
 
II. Zero: Meaning and Consequence 
 
Zero is an unusual number. Mathematically it is the 
number that can be added to any other number and result in 
the original number; it is the dividing line between positive and 
negative numbers; it is the average of any number and its 
negative. 
From the perspective of daily life, it stands out from the 
other natural numbers—it is rarely necessary to count how 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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many of something exist where there are none. As a result, zero 
is a late entrant to the world of numbers.1 Think back to grade 
school and try to recall the symbol for the Roman numeral zero. 
You don’t, because there is none. Early mathematicians dealt 
with positive real numbers because their world experience was 
limited to positive real numbers: a prehistoric hunting party 
may have considered the wisdom of attacking a herd of a dozen 
wooly mammoths, but it is doubtful that any considered the 
question of what to do in the face of negative three wooly 
mammoths.2 Without the concept of negative numbers, zero’s 
role as the dividing line between positive and negative does not 
arise. 
Likewise, in a pre-technological society, where 
measurement is done purely by human eyes, mathematical 
experience deals with the world on a macro scale, so the 
“nothingness” of zero makes little difference. The concept of “no 
wooly mammoths” has a fixed and definite meaning. The 
introduction of measurement technology changes the concept in 
an important way. 
“Zero” really means “below detectable limits”—in a pre-
technological society “no wooly mammoths” means “no wooly 
mammoths close enough to be seen or heard.” Development of a 
 
1. Mathematically, zero serves two functions: as a number (the whole 
number between -1 and +1) and as a placeholder (distinguishing 1 from 10). 
Historically, there have been at least two recognitions of the numerical zero, 
one developing between 400 and 300 B.C. in Babylon, developing in India, 
“wending its way through northern Africa and . . . crossing into Europe via 
Italy” circa 1200, the other arising independently in the New World, in 
Mayan culture, likely in the first few centuries A.D. John Matson, The Origin 
of Zero, SCI. AM. (Aug. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=history-of-zero (citing 
CHARLES SEIFE, ZERO: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA (Viking 2000)). 
Jolanta Swiderek argues that Aristotle was the first to recognize the number 
zero. Jolanta Swiderek, Section Paper presented at Twentieth World 
Congress of Philosophy held at Boston University: A Notion of μηδέv in the 
Philosophy of Aristotle (Aug. 10-15, 1998), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciSwid.htm (“The first notion of an 
abstract zero, that is a number zero, in the history of human thought 
appeared in Aristotle's philosophy in the 4th c. [sic] BC . . . [t]he Philosopher 
could not accepted [sic] it since it would lead him to contradiction. The basic 
principles of his metaphysics demanded the rejection of this notion just as 
they demanded the rejection of a notion of nothingness or actual infinity.”). 
2. Arguably, it might have been important for prehistoric people to know 
“no saber tooth tigers around,” but that isn’t really a counting exercise. 
3
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telescope changes the inquiry. Now the answer to the question 
of “how many wooly mammoths are around?” depends on how 
good the telescope is.3 As measurement technology improves, 
the answer changes and becomes a function of the precision of 
the measuring instrument. The concept of precision is implicit 
in all systems of measurement, but it is not an important 
consideration in early systems. Prior to the eighteenth century, 
there was no international standard weight, and agreements 
based on weight needed to include a definition of the reference 
weight. The scientific definition of a kilogram has evolved from 
the eighteenth century (the mass of a cubic decimeter of water) 
to the more precise definition adopted by the General 
Conference on Weights and Measures (“CGPM”) in 1889 as the 
mass of a specific platinum-iridium bar maintained by the 
International Bureau of Weights and Measures under 
conditions specified by the 1st CGPM in 1889.4 
 
3. Galileo faced a similar problem in 1610 when he built a telescope 
which enabled him to see several of Jupiter’s moons and to observe the 
phases of Venus, leading him to believe that the earth revolved around the 
sun. GALILEO GALILEI, SIDEREUS NUNCIUS 28 (Peter Barker trans., Byzantium 
Press 2004) (1610). This led to an inquiry by the Inquisition, which (not 
having as good a telescope) concluded: “That the sun is the center of the 
world and motionless is a proposition which is philosophically absurd and 
false . . . ;That the earth is neither the center of the world nor motionless . . . 
is philosophically equally absurd and false . . . .” MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO, 
THE GALILEO AFFAIR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 288 (Maurice Finocchiaro ed. 
& trans., Univ.Cal. Press, 1989). 
4. Unit of Mass (Kilogram), NAT’L INST. SCI. & TECH., 
http://physics.nist.gov/cuu/Units/kilogram.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). 
Accuracy in measuring time has also advanced dramatically. In the late 
sixteenth century, astronomer Tycho Brahe’s observatory used some of the 
earliest mechanical clocks capable of displaying seconds, but the agreement 
between the clocks was only plus or minus four seconds. With the advance of 
the science of physics in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
ability to measure small quantities improved dramatically. By the mid-
twentieth, time was no longer being measured by the period of the revolution 
of the earth around the sun (which varies from year to year) but was 
measured using atomic transitions (the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of 
the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine 
levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom), with an accuracy to 10-10. 
However, even atomic clocks have undergone recent redefinition to account 
for the time-dilation effect of distance from the earth’s gravitational center 
(1980) and to account for temperature (1997). NIST-F1 Cesium Fountain 
Atomic Clock, The Primary Time and Frequency Standard for the United 
Stated, NAT’L INST. SCI. & TECH., 
http://www.nist.gov/pml/div688/grp50/primary-frequency-standards.cfm (last 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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Once it is recognized that the meaning of “zero” is, in 
effect, “below detectable limits”5 the legal issue becomes 
apparent. A statute that uses the term zero (or a variant, 
discussed below) means “so close to nothing that we can’t detect 
it”—and, therefore, becomes closer and closer to mathematical 
zero as the detection technology improves. As the ability to 
detect improves, the legal standard changes—without the 
intervention of a court or legislature.6 Moreover, there are two 
types of legal zero: explicit and implicit. An example of an 
explicit zero is an environmental statute which calls for “zero” 
visible emissions.7 An example of an implicit zero is a speeding 
statute. Although the speeding statute sets a non-zero 
benchmark, this is equivalent to “zero above” the benchmark—
for example, a thirty mph speed limit translates into “zero 
more than thirty mph.” Viewed this way, the use of zero in 
legislation is common. 
It may, at first glance, appear that it is simple to conclude 
that better detection translating into tighter standards is a 
good result; better detection means better enforcement and 
better compliance. A few examples will illustrate why this is 
not necessarily the case. 
Imagine a rational legislature, attempting to balance 
 
updated Feb. 4, 2013). Current cesium clocks are accurate to within about 
one second in thirty million years. Id. 
5. It follows from this definition that the meaning of “no” is “not 
detectable” or, arguably, “not detected.” 
6. As the ability to measure more precisely improves, the meaning of a 
number changes. If it is only possible to measure in increments of .5, then a 
statute or agreement requiring “1" means between .5 and 1.5—anything in 
that range will be detected as “1". If a detector is developed which permits 
measurement in increments of 0.1, the meaning of “1" will be narrowed to 
between 0.9 and 1.1. Things that were previously permissible under the 
statute or agreement have now become violative, even though the statute (or 
agreement) has not changed, nor has the thing being done. 
7. An example of such a statute is the standard authorized by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412 (2012) and implemented by regulations published in 40 C.F.R. § 
63.302 (2013). Interestingly, as discussed at infra Part IV.B, the standard 
was originally based on whether emissions were observed for more than a 
specified period of time by a “certified observer” (i.e., a person) but modified 
as the technology became available, to allow 24/7 machine detection. In effect, 
the standard was tightened without amending the regulations or providing 
public notice as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See 
infra Part III.B for a more detailed discussion of the notice requirements. 
5
  
6 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
environmental health with economic health. After careful 
analysis, it concludes that if a particular industry spends $1 on 
pollution control, there will be $2 in environmental benefits, 
that the industry can afford the extra $1 cost, and that this 
level of control will be achieved by a statutory standard of zero 
emissions of a particular pollutant. At the time, the best 
available detection technology can detect one part per thousand 
of the pollutant.8 After the standard is set, however, detection 
technology improves so that it is now possible to detect one part 
per million. In effect, the standard for control technology has 
been made a thousand times more stringent. The cost of 
reducing pollution to less than one part per thousand (the old 
standard) was $1 and the legislature concluded this was a 
reasonable cost for the anticipated benefits. Suppose, however, 
that the cost to reduce the pollution to one part per million (the 
new standard) is not $1 but $100. The justification for the 
standard—the determination that the environmental benefit 
exceeded the cost of compliance—is no longer valid.9 Instead of 
a $2 benefit for every $1 spent, the statute imposes a $100 cost 
for every $2 in benefit. 
Imagine that the same legislature decided to build a new 
superhighway. Although the cost is high, it is justified by the 
time that will be saved in commuting and the economic 
development that will result from expanding the area from 
which people can commute. Suppose the highway engineers 
report that the safe speed on the road is eighty mph and the 
economics of the road project are based on travel at a constant 
speed of seventy-five mph (to allow a margin of safety). At that 
speed, the cost of the road is justified by a cost-benefit analysis 
showing a return of 200% of the cost. When it comes time to set 
the speed limit on the road, one legislator observes that people 
often exceed the speed limit and assume that being a “little bit” 
 
8. This detection level means that a company will be out of compliance 
with the standard if it emits more than one molecule of the pollutant in every 
thousand molecules of sample. Below that level, the company may be 
emitting the pollutant but there is no way to know that. 
9. If the legislature’s original determination, that the value of the 
reduction was $2, is correct, then the new standard will cause $100 of 
economic damage for every $2 of environmental benefit. This is not to say 
that a legislature could not reach the conclusion that this is still desirable—it 
is simply that the legislature has not reached that conclusion. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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over will not lead to a citation, so that to get traffic moving at 
between seventy-five mph and eighty mph, the speed limit 
needs to be lower than seventy-five mph. How much lower? If 
the then-existing detection technology is a speedometer 
calibrated in five mph increments, then a seventy mph limit is 
appropriate: drivers can travel at up to seventy-five mph 
without being detected as violating the limit10 and the cost-
benefit analysis is sound. Suppose, however, that detection 
technology improves so that one mph increments can be 
detected. Now traffic must move at no more than seventy-one 
mph to avoid violating the speed limit.11 This would not be a 
problem if the legislature had considered and approved it. 
Legislatures are empowered to make cost-benefit decisions.12 
However, in the absence of an examination of the issue and an 
analysis of the costs and benefits of this new limit, a problem is 
presented: the cost-benefit analysis that was done, under then 
existing technological assumptions, is no longer valid. 
Thus, better measurement technology does not always lead 
to an improvement in the underlying law. 
Accepting that zero13 takes on a new meaning, which 
 
10. This is based on the simplifying assumption that the speedometer 
indicator changes when the next level is reached—i.e., that when a vehicle 
goes from sixty-nine mph to seventy mph, the speedometer reading goes from 
sixty-five mph to seventy mph. 
11. Improved detection does not necessarily lead to increased regulation. 
For example, suppose a legislature wants to remove X units of a pollutant per 
year, as required for example under the federal non-attainment regulations, 
discussed infra Part IV.B. If the limit of detection is Y, then the standard 
must be set to remove X + Y units in order to meet the requirement. If the 
detection limit improves to .5Y, the limit can be lowered to X + .5Y, thus 
allowing the possibility of a more relaxed standard (and presumably less 
costly controls). In either case, however, if the legislation was based on a 
cost/benefit analysis, that analysis will become unbalanced by virtue of the 
improved detection technology. 
12. "The decision whether the law of diminishing returns should have 
any place in the regulation of toxic substances is quintessentially one of 
legislative policy." Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 686 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). It would also likely not be a 
problem if an administrative agency—for example, a state motor vehicles 
administration—had made the decision pursuant to the exercise of a proper 
delegation of authority. 
13. The same analysis applies to any number. Zero provides a 
convenient way to re-conceptualize a variety of problems so that the same 
analysis can be applied. For example, a speed limit of thirty mph may be 
7
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varies according to the ability to distinguish something from 
nothing, technological advances that increase the precision of 
any measurement in effect rewrite the law relating to that 
which is measured. Is this an acceptable result? Laws are 
changed all the time, by legislatures and courts—does it matter 
if the change is, instead, wrought by a private party and is 
controlled by the ingenuity of inventors and the economics of 
the marketplace? 
 
III. The Power to Make Law 
 
A. Direct Lawmaking—Legislatures and Courts 
 
According to classical theory, there are two ways in which 
laws are created:14 legislative enactment15 and common law 
judicial development.16 Both legislature-made law and judge-
made law involve explicit decisions by public officials,17 both 
 
thought of as a requirement that speed not exceed thirty mph by more than 
zero. 
14. See Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 119 N.E.2d 440, 443 (Ohio 1954) 
(“[S]tandard of conduct . . . may be specifically established by legislative 
enactment; by judicial decisions . . . ; or, in the absence of legislative 
enactment or judicial decision, by a consideration . . . of the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.”); ANTHONY D’AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A 
DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-41 (1984); LON FULLER, 
ANATOMY OF THE LAW 59 (1968); Anthony D’Amato, Can Legislatures 
Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 561 (1989). 
There is some debate as to the scope of the power of the Executive to make 
laws by treaty. See, e.g., Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization through 
Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 445, 483-88 (2007). In any event, that power requires action 
by at least one branch of the legislature. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2. 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I. Legislatures may delegate certain types of 
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies (e.g., APA), arguably 
creating a third form of lawmaking. Validly adopted agency rules have the 
force of statute. W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980); Bd. 
of Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 
(1981). Thus, considering agency-made law a separate category from 
legislation would not change the analysis. 
16. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
17. While legislative laws are enacted and common law is announced, it 
is convenient to use the term “post-enactment” to describe technology which 
is developed after the law in question has been established—whether by 
legislative enactment or judicial creation. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
  
2014] TECHNOLOGICAL LAW MAKING 9 
are the result of a deliberative process informed by some degree 
of attention to public policy, both produce public records, and 
both are subject to established processes of review and, 
ultimately, accountability to the public. 
Legislatures and, to a greater extent courts, have 
traditionally dealt with the problem of applying existing laws 
to new circumstances, including circumstances which were 
unforeseen at the time the law was originally created.18 
In particular, past technological advances have required 
interpretation and application of laws to new circumstances. 
Copyright law is a good example, having faced several waves of 
interpretation in response to such changes in the technology 
available for copying and expressing the content of 
copyrightable works. For example, when piano music rolls and 
the phonograph were invented in the late nineteenth century, 
courts were challenged to interpret and apply existing 
copyright law to these new technologies, unforeseen at the time 
the statute was enacted. Producers of music rolls and records 
sold physical objects capable of reproducing sounds that 
embodied works copyrighted as sheet music. In White-Smith 
Music v. Apollo, the Supreme Court held that these “pianola 
rolls” were not copies (within the meaning of the then-current 
copyright statute) of the sheet music composition which they 
reproduced and, therefore, did not infringe the author’s 
copyright.19 One year later, Congress amended the copyright 
statute to address the issue and provided that record 
companies could embody musical compositions in pianola rolls 
and records by paying a statutory fee.20 
Likewise, early cable operators captured over-the-air 
television broadcast signals and retransmitted them to 
subscribers without compensating the owners of the copyrights 
in the original broadcast. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
 
18. In response to the emergence of personal computers, Congress 
enacted section 117 of the Copyright Act, which provided for “interim” rules 
regarding copyright protection for computer software, pending further study. 
More than thirty years later, section 117 remains unchanged. Courts have 
been more active in resolving the issues posed by computers. 17 U.S.C. § 117 
(2012); See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 19, 21-27. 
19. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1908). 
20. Copyright Act § 1(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 
(2012)). 
9
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Television, Inc., the Court held that cable retransmission was 
not public performance under the then-existing copyright 
statute, and thus did not infringe on copyright owners’ rights.21 
In Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, the Court held that cable 
television’s importation of remote signals was also non-
infringing.22 
Another set of copyright interpretative issues arose in 
connection with the advent of the new technology of 
photocopiers. Publishers sued the National Institute of Health 
and the National Library of Medicine for systematic 
photocopying of journals they published.23 An equally divided 
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims’ finding that this 
constituted fair use and therefore did not infringe the 
publishers’ copyrights.24 
A series of cases has tested the application of existing 
copyright law to the storage and transfer of files over the 
internet. Courts first found that centralized file storage and 
sharing violated the copyright on the stored files,25 then 
reached the same conclusion, but as to decentralized 
management of stored files.26 In both cases, courts found that a 
substantial portion of the files involved were infringing.27 
The problems dealt with in these cases, however, differ 
 
21. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 
398-401 (1968). 
22. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 410-15 (1974). 
23. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1346-47 
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d per curiam, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
24. Id. at 1359. While the majority in Court of Claims decision found 
that this constituted fair use, the dissent characterized the ruling as “the 
Dred Scott decision of copyright law.” Id. at 1387 (Nichols, J., dissenting). For 
the current codification of the Fair Use Doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
25. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012-17 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
26. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937-41 
(2005). 
27. See id. at 923 (“MGM's evidence gives reason to think that the vast 
majority of users' downloads are acts of infringement . . . [meaning that] the 
probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering.”); Napster, 239 F.3d 
at 1012-17; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 
911 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“[V]irtually all Napster users engage in the 
unauthorized downloading or uploading of copyrighted music; as much as 
eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted . . . 
.”), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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from the problem of new technology changing the meaning of 
existing law. These cases involve applying a known rule to a 
new problem, a classic judicial task, even if the new problem 
was one unforeseen at the time the rule was adopted. In the 
case of technology-made law, the challenge is applying a known 
rule to a known problem, with the complication that the 
meaning of the rule itself has changed, which is of potentially 
far broader impact and which poses the possibility of 
disappointing settled expectations.28 
In order to answer the question of whether the 
introduction of private actors into the formulation of law is a 
problem, one additional concept—that of delegation—needs to 
be considered. 
 
B. Delegated Lawmaking—Administrative Agencies 
 
There is at least one category of governmental action that 
arguably changes law29 and falls outside the two areas 
(legislative and judicial) described above. 
Legislatures frequently create administrative agencies and 
delegate to them the task of developing procedures and rules 
for implementing legislation. These agencies are called on to 
adjudicate matters or to provide generalized guidance on the 
interpretation and enforcement of statutes. This power is 
constrained, however, by the Constitution30 and by the 
Administrative Procedure Act31 (“APA). 
 
28. Of course, if a legislature changed the meaning of a rule, the problem 
would not arise. The issue is posed when the change in meaning takes place 
outside the classic law-making process. 
29. As discussed in this section, there are types of agency actions that 
create rights or obligations. Presumably, however, any interpretations or 
adjudications by an agency are consistent with the statute that the agency 
operates under. Furthermore, in the legislation creating the agency, Congress 
may place constraints on the agency, and it often “legislatively limit[s] the 
factors an agency may consider.” David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 82 
(2005). 
30. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I-III. The analysis focuses on federal 
agencies. Most states have similar statutes governing state administrative 
agencies. 
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012). 
11
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Among the provisions of the APA are requirements that an 
agency give public notice of proposed rulemaking and that the 
agency solicit and consider public comments on its proposed 
rules.32 The APA distinguishes between agency rulemaking, 
which is merely interpretative (and does not require notice and 
comment),33 and that which is substantive.34 Substantive 
rulemaking, which establishes rights and duties, requires 
public notice, while interpretative rulemaking does not require 
public participation and is merely a statement of how an 
agency intends to act.35 Although the line between the two has 
been described as “murky,”36 legislative rules may be thought 
of as those that create new laws granting rights or imposing 
obligations,37 while interpretative rules clarify existing law or 
regulations, state how an agency will interpret existing law or 
regulations,38 or deal with internal agency matters such as 
 
32. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) requires that “[g]eneral notice of proposed 
rule making [sic] shall be published in the Federal Register” unless affected 
parties are given actual notice and that the notice include the legal authority 
for the rule and the proposed rule. Interested parties must also be given the 
opportunity to participate in the rule making and the agency must consider 
relevant matter presented. § 553(b)(3). 
33. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
34. The APA does not define the distinction between substantive and 
interpretative rules. Courts generally draw the distinction between rules that 
clarify and those that create rights or duties. See, e.g., White v. Shalala, 7 
F.3d 296, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1993); Metro. School Dist. of Wayne Twp. v. Davila, 
969 F.2d 485, 488-93 (7th Cir. 1992). The Attorney General's Manual on the 
APA describes substantive rules as “rules . . . issued by an agency pursuant 
to statutory authority and which implement the statute,” and interpretative 
rules as “rules . . . issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s 
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT 30 n.3 (1947). 
35. See New Jersey v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262, 
1281-82 (3d Cir. 1981). 
36. Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 631 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004). 
37. See, e.g., SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 497-98 (3d Cir. 2005); 
White, 7 F.3d at 303-04; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 926-
31 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Friedrich v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 
829, 833-37 (6th Cir. 1990); Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 
844, 894-99 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
38. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1186-95 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Fed. Labor 
Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 761-65 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 909-16 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
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organization.39 
In addition to providing a source of information to the 
agency, the requirement to follow a notice and comment 
procedure when creating rights and obligations has at least two 
important justifications. Such public participation introduces 
an element of accountability in what is, after all, an unelected 
body and comports with notions of fairness to any affected 
parties by providing an opportunity to influence the agency by 
making concerns known.40 
If the legislature has provided the necessary power and the 
agency has provided adequate public notice, delegation of law 
making power is permissible. More is needed, however, to 
reach the conclusion that delegation to private parties is also 
permissible. 
 
C. Technological Lawmaking—Inventors and the Marketplace 
 
In addition to the classical mechanisms for creating law,41 
there is an additional mechanism for changing law. This 
mechanism emerged without fanfare in the middle of the 
twentieth century and takes on increasing importance as the 
pace of technological development accelerates. Advances in 
technology may change the meaning of a law even though the 
words of a statute remain unchanged. While there is explicit 
constitutional authority for legislative enactment42 and 
common law judicial development,43 there is no constitutional 
 
39. Erringer, 371 F.3d at 630. 
40. Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Constitutes “Interpretative 
Rule” of Agency so as to Exempt Such Action from Notice Requirements of 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b)(3)(a)), 126 A.L.R. FED. 347, 
§§ 2(a), 13(a) (1995). 
41. Legislative enactments, judicially created common law, judicial 
interpretation, and, arguably, delegated rulemaking by administrative 
agencies are discussed supra Part III.A. 
42. U.S. CONST. art. I. Legislatures may delegate certain types of 
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies, arguably creating a third 
form of lawmaking. See e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 
(2012). Validly adopted agency rules have the force of statute. See W. Oil & 
Gas Ass’n, 633 F.2d at 807-13; Bd. of Educ., 622 F.2d at 613, cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1124 (1981). Thus, considering agency-made law a separate category 
from legislation would not change the analysis. 
43. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
13
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authority for private parties to make laws.44 Unlike the 
classical mechanisms for changing law, this mechanism is not 
dependent on the decision of a public official, need not even be 
explicitly intended to change existing law, rarely results from 
considerations of public policy, is not generally the subject of 
published deliberations and is subject to review only in the 
sense that companies respond to market failures and 
legislatures have the power to amend statutes if they 
determine that developments subsequent to enactment 
warrant such response. Although it can have a profound 
economic impact,45 legislatures rarely consider it. 
Although this technological development is not overseen by 
any government entity, it can have the consequence of 
changing the meaning of existing laws by a process that would 
not pass muster even if it were adopted by an administrative 
agency. As discussed in Part III(B), an administrative agency 
would, at a minimum, need to provide notice of its intended 
action and consider public comments on the proposal. Further, 
the administrative agency would be accountable to Congress 
and therefore, at least indirectly, to the public. 
Certainly, once statutes have been enacted, there is a role 
for private parties. Although the government can set the rules, 
independent actors can decide how to operate within those 
rules. For example, in the case of federal income taxation, 
Congress can establish tax rates, rules for determining taxable 
income, and the dates on which taxes are due. The Internal 
Revenue Service can establish rules for reporting taxes and 
resolving issues in interpreting the tax code. However, the 
actual amount of tax revenue collected is not determined by 
 
44. Private parties can, of course, enter contracts (which may be thought 
of as a sort of private “law”), but contracts only bind the contracting parties 
and certain third party beneficiaries. 
45. While national data is not available, the economic impact of the use 
of speed cameras must be in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year. 
When the accuracy of its speed cameras forced the City of Baltimore (a city 
with a population of less than a million people) to suspend their use, the city 
lost $90,000 per weekday in revenues. Scott Calvert, City Gives No Restart 
Data for Camera Tickets, BALT. SUN (June 13, 2013), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-06-13/news/bs-md-speed-cam-june-
meeting-20130613_1_speed-cameras-brekford-corp-camera-tickets. Pollution 
control costs are easily in the billion-dollar range each year. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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Congress46—that depends on the actions of others (how much 
money taxpayers earn, how they arrange their finances, and 
the general state of the economy, among others.)47 
However, there are important distinctions that preclude 
bringing technology-made law within the authority granted to 
legislatures and courts, or within the authorization of 
administrative delegation. 
The most obvious distinction is that legislatures are 
elected and directly accountable to the public. Judges are either 
elected (in some jurisdictions) or appointed by elected officials, 
and senior administrative officials are appointed by elected 
officials and therefore indirectly accountable to the public. 
Technology-made law is created by inventors and companies, 
who are accountable (if at all) to stockholders.48 
Legislators, judges and administrative agencies are not 
only publicly accountable, but in most cases act in public and 
create publicly accessible records. Except in rare cases,49 
companies developing new technologies are under no obligation 
to disclose their plans (and, in fact, generally are motivated to 
keep such plans confidential). 
While subject to lobbying and persuasion, legislators 
presumably make decisions based on their evaluations of public 
interests, while private companies generally make decisions 
based on their evaluation of profit potential. Moreover, 
Congress is the one body empowered to impair contracts—state 
 
46. The amount of revenue expected is certainly a factor in setting tax 
rates. 
47. This constraint on legislative power is not necessarily unwelcome to 
the legislature. For example, states with property taxes are able to keep the 
tax rate constant while receiving rising revenue when property values rise, 
and thus can raise tax revenues while claiming not to have raised taxes. See 
Mark Perry, Tax Rates (%) X Tax Base = Tax Revenue ($), DAILYMARKETS 
(May 17, 2011), http://www.dailymarkets.com/economy/2011/05/17/tax-rates-
x-tax-base-tax-revenue. 
48. It would be rare for a decision to invest in development of a new 
technology to rise to the level where it would require stockholder approval. 
49. Examples would include companies that are required to file reports 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and transactions 
which either required stockholder approval (and therefore triggered the 
SEC’s proxy rules), or which were material (and therefore required disclosure 
under SEC’s reporting rules.) 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.14a-2 (2013). These 
situations would be rare. 
15
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legislatures and private individuals are constitutionally 
prohibited from doing so.50 
Thus, technological law making cannot be justified as an 
extension of traditional law making.51 If technological law 
making does not have the force of law, the question remains 
how it should impact legitimate laws: how should courts use 
post-enactment technological advances in deciding cases under 
those enactments? 
If courts use post-enactment technology in interpreting 
and applying laws, then technological advances have been 
incorporated in the law and the result is as though, in effect, 
technology-made law rises to the same level as classical-made 
law. On the other hand, ignoring technological advances may 
produce less than optimal results, without any offsetting 
benefit. 
Given that the meaning of zero is not constant, but is a 
function of available technology, how should laws setting an 
explicit or implicit zero standard be interpreted?52 Two options 
are available: interpret the law using the meaning of zero at 
the time the law was created (technology static interpretation), 
or allow the meaning of zero to evolve and apply the meaning of 
zero at the time of application (technology dynamic 
interpretation), in effect leaving the meaning of the law in the 
hands of inventors. 
Two examples will help develop a process for determining 
when to ignore post-enactment technological advances and 
when to consider them in interpreting and applying the law. 
 
 
 
50. Such action by the federal government would be prohibited by U.S. 
CONST. art. I § 10 and the Fifth Amendment, by a State government would be 
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, and by private party would 
constitute breach of contract or inducement, depending on whether the 
private party was a party to the contract or not. 
51. Without having conducted a survey, it would seem intuitive that 
there would be general outrage if one were to propose that an anonymous 
private party should have the power to make law. 
52. Of course, under standard rules of interpretation, legislative intent 
is relevant. Legislatures rarely consider the issue of measurement precision. 
Two arguable exceptions are the fields of occupational safety and 
environmental control, discussed at infra notes 77-78. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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IV. Illustrative Examples 
 
The following examples illustrate an analytic approach 
suitable for determining whether post-enactment technological 
development should affect the interpretation of a law. One 
would seem to lead to the conclusion that the interpretation 
should be technology-static and should be based on the 
technology that existed at the time the law was created. The 
other would seem to be suitable for a technology-dynamic 
interpretation, based on the state of technology at the time the 
law is being applied to particular circumstances. 
The distinctions are then distilled into a set of principles 
that should govern resolution of the question (static or dynamic 
interpretation) in other cases. 
 
A. Speeding and Technology Freezing Interpretation 
 
The technology for measuring vehicle speeds, and 
determining whether a speed limit violation has taken place, 
has improved dramatically in the last hundred years. Speeds 
can now be measured to within tenths of a mile per hour using 
inexpensive and widely available equipment. Notwithstanding 
the availability of this precision measurement, the majority of 
courts apply the law in a manner that acknowledges much of 
the imprecision of early twentieth century measuring 
techniques. While judicial justifications vary, this may be seen 
as an example of a technology-static law. 
In the early twentieth century, speeds were measured by a 
police officer following the suspect vehicle, matching its speed, 
and reading the speedometer in the officer’s car.53 The precision 
of the evidence of speed depended, among other things, on the 
accuracy of the police car speedometer, and tickets were rarely 
issued for speeds less than five miles over the speed limit.54 
 
53. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parish, 10 A.2d 896, 896-97 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1940) (officer followed vehicle for 1.9 miles and measured speed of sixty 
mph in a fifty mph zone—statute required tracking for at least .25 mile.); 
City of Spokane v. Knight, 165 P. 105, 105-06 (Wash. 1917) (motorcycle 
officer followed vehicle and measured speed of twenty-seven mph to thirty 
mph in a twenty mph zone). 
54. United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 595 n.13 (4th Cir. 2012) (“It 
17
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There have been two dramatic changes in speed limit 
enforcement. Radar and laser technology now enable 
measurement of vehicle speeds to within a fraction of a mile 
per hour, and these new technologies also make their 
measurements instantaneously55 rather than requiring 
monitoring a vehicle over a significant distance. Furthermore, 
incorporating a recording device with the speed-measuring 
device allows violations to be detected without the presence of a 
police officer—a remotely monitored system can operate 24/7 
and detect all violations, not just those that occur in the 
presence of a human observer. 
Note how the definition of a speeding violation has 
changed, without the intervention of a legislature or a court. 
Originally, “exceeding thirty-five mph” meant “traveling at a 
speed of at least forty mph, if a police officer happened to see 
you, and continuing this behavior (notwithstanding the fact 
that a police car was following you) for a period of several 
seconds.” Now, that same language (“exceeding thirty-five 
mph”) can mean “traveling at a speed of at least 35.1 mph for a 
fraction of a second.” 
Several states (and the federal government)56 have 
explicitly addressed this, and have chosen to preserve 
something of the historic meaning by statute. Florida requires 
warnings for exceeding the speed limit by five mph or less 
(except in school zones).57 Georgia limits citations to exceeding 
 
is worth noting that the dissent has not cited—nor have we found—a single 
case issued by any court at any time, whether state or federal, finding 
probable cause exists to initiate a traffic stop for speeding on the sole basis of 
an officer's unaided visual estimate that a vehicle was exceeding the speed 
limit by five mph or less.”). Some states, by statute, limit the assessment of 
points or grade the severity of the offense (for example, requiring that only a 
warning be issued) for speeds within five or ten miles of the limit. See infra 
note 55-62 and accompanying text. 
55. Sticklers will complain that an instantaneous measurement is not 
possible—it is just very fast compared to the pacing method—and possibly 
summon Heisenberg in support of the argument that a police officer could not 
specify both where the violation occurred and how fast the vehicle was going. 
Such people probably should not try traffic cases. 
56. The Federal Highway Administration recommends at least five mph 
tolerance. See Discretionary Cooperative Agreements To Support the 
Demonstration and Evaluation of Setting and Enforcing Rational Speed 
Limits, 66 Fed. Reg. 29855-02 (June 1, 2001). 
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 318.18(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2013). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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the speed limit by more than five mph.58 Kansas does not 
assess points on a driver’s record for exceeding the speed limit 
by less than ten mph where the speed limit is fifty-five to 
seventy-five mph.59 Oklahoma does not assess points on a 
driver’s record for exceeding the speed limit by less than ten 
mph.60 Pennsylvania authorizes measuring vehicle speed by 
pacing, but only if the speed is measured for at least 0.3 
miles,61 and by radar and other electronic devices but only if 
the speed is six mph or more in excess of the legal speed limit 
(ten mph or more in an area where the legal speed limit is less 
than fifty-five mph) except in school and work zones.62 
Most state legislatures, however, have not addressed the 
issue. While rare,63 most courts faced with the question of “how 
fast is too fast” reach the same conclusion as the above-
mentioned states, and require a “significant” speed differential. 
Though none of these decisions rest on an explicit recognition 
of the technology-dynamic/technology-static issue, they are 
consistent with the principle. 
In Missouri, courts have affirmed a speeding conviction 
based upon a fifteen mph differential64 while reversing a 
speeding conviction based upon a ten mph differential,65 based 
on the rationale that the results were required by “the margin 
of error of accuracy within which an experienced person can 
discriminate between the two speeds.”66 
 
58. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 40, § 40-6-1 (LexisNexis 2013). 
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1560(d)-(c) (LexisNexis 2013). 
60. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-810(A) (LexisNexis 2013). 
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 3368(a) (West 2013). 
62. § 3368(c)(4). 
63. The rarity of appellate decisions regarding speeding probably has to 
do with the relatively low cost of a speeding violation compared to the cost of 
a trial and appeal. Many of the cases dealing with speeding involve the 
question of whether there was probable cause to suspect speeding as a 
predicate for a vehicle stop which led to a search and discovery of a more 
serious offense. 
64. See State v. Kimes, 234 S.W.3d 584, 589-90 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
65. See Kansas City v. Oxley, 579 S.W.2d 113, 115-16 (Mo. 1979). 
66. Kimes, 234 S.W.3d at 589; see also State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188, 
197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (sustaining a speeding conviction, even though there 
was a question as to the accuracy of the measurement, because the radar unit 
had indicated that the defendant was driving in excess of fifteen mph over 
the limit). 
19
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The Fourth Circuit has recently held that an officer’s 
visual speed estimate of seventy-five mph in a seventy mph 
zone did not provide probable cause to initiate a traffic stop for 
speeding.67 This case was complicated by the officer’s difficulty 
in explaining how he estimated speed. After reviewing the 
following testimony: 
 
Q. [Government counsel] And how many feet are 
in a hundred yards? 
A. [Deputy Elliott] There’s 12 [sic] feet in a yard. 
Q. So 300 feet? 
A. Correct. 
. . . . 
THE COURT: And how many feet are in a yard? 
[Deputy Elliott]: How many feet? There’s 12 [sic] 
feet in a yard. 
THE COURT: Well, do you know what a 
yardstick is? 
[Deputy Elliott]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: How many inches in a yardstick? 
[Deputy Elliott]: Well, on a yardstick there’s 12 
[sic] inches. Well, it depends on the yard stick 
that . . . you have.68 
 
The Fourth Circuit held that for “the district court to find that 
Deputy Elliott’s ‘difficulty with measurements is immaterial to 
his estimate of speed as that did not depend on time or 
distance’ . . . . rings in the absurd . . . .”69 
These decisions are consistent with (and arguably 
influenced by) the degree of accuracy associated with human 
observation of speed. Sowards explicitly makes the comparison, 
citing several cases to make the point, comparing acceptable 
estimations70 with unacceptable estimations.71 
 
67. Sowards, 690 F.3d at 594.. 
68. Id. at 586. 
69. Id. at 589. 
70. Id. at 591-92; See United States v. Banks, No. 2:08-cr-19-FtM-
29SPC, 2008 WL 4194847, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2008) (probable cause 
where officer estimated speed to be fifty to sixty mph in a thirty mph zone); 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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Thus, enforcement of speed limits appears to be an 
example of a technology-static law from the perspective of the 
meaning of “miles per hour” in the definition of speeding. 
This conclusion comports with notions of fairness and 
perhaps a lingering sense that the right to confront one’s 
accusers is somehow diminished when the accuser is a 
machine, and a fallible machine at that.72 When the average 
motorist’s speedometer is rarely tested for accuracy and may, 
as in many vehicles still on the road, be an analog device with 
speeds marked in five mph increments, holding that motorist 
(who must divide attention between monitoring speed and 
other important tasks while driving) to the current 
technologically feasible standard of a fraction of a mile per hour 
measured instantaneously does not seem fair, and the great 
weight of authority agrees. 
 
B. Pollution and Technology Forcing Interpretation 
 
As with the technology for measuring vehicle speeds, the 
technology for measuring emissions of pollutants has improved 
dramatically in recent years. An example is the measurement 
 
State v. Butts, 269 P.3d 862, 871-74 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (reasonable 
suspicion where officer estimated speed to be forty-five mph in a thirty mph 
zone); People v. Olsen, 239 N.E.2d 354, 355 (N.Y. 1968) (sustaining conviction 
where officer estimated speed to be fifty to fifty-five mph in a thirty mph 
zone). 
71. See Oxley, 579 S.W.2d at 116 (estimate of forty-five mph speed in a 
thirty-five mph zone insufficient); Olsen, 239 N.E.2d at 355 (estimate of 
thirty-five to forty mph in a thirty mph zone might “for obvious reason” be 
insufficient); Kimes, 234 S.W.3d at 589 (estimate of sixty mph speed in a fifty-
five mph zone insufficient, “because the accuracy of human estimation of 
speed cannot easily, readily, and accurately discriminate between such small 
variations in speed.”). 
72. A recent audit of Baltimore’s speed camera citations disclosed one 
vehicle clocked at thirty-eight mph – despite the fact that it was stopped at a 
red light (as shown by the City’s own photographs) at the time. Scott Calvert, 
City Issued Speed Camera Ticket to Motionless Car, BALT. SUN (Dec. 12, 
2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-12-12/news/bs-md-speed-camera-
stopped-car-20121212_1_potential-citation-xerox-state-camera-ticket (“The 
Baltimore City speed camera ticket alleged that the four-door Mazda wagon 
was going 38 miles per hour in a 25-mph zone . . . But the Mazda wasn't 
speeding. It wasn't even moving. The two photos printed on the citation as 
evidence of speeding show the car was idling at a red light with its brake 
lights illuminated.”) 
21
  
22 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
of “visible emissions.” When the first modern environmental 
laws governing visible emissions were passed, a violation 
required observation by a human observer. The observer had to 
be a person who had passed a certification program and had to 
observe the visible emission for a specified period of time 
(which varied depending on the type of facility being observed). 
Thus, in order to be in violation, a facility needed not only to be 
emitting a visible pollutant, but needed to be doing so in 
daylight (the observer could not see the emissions at night) and 
needed to be doing so when the certified observer was 
present.73 Clearly this standard allowed significant visible 
emissions to go undetected. Detection technology improved to 
the point where mechanical sensors could be installed and 
could monitor a facility twenty-four hours a day and could 
detect much slighter emissions than a human observer could 
see.74  
In effect, this equates to a dramatic reduction in amount of 
pollution without a change in the statutory language. Similar 
reductions have, in effect, taken place under the Clean Air 
Act,75 the Clean Water Act,76 and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act,77 all of which set technology based standards. 
 
73. 40 C.F.R. § 63.302 (2013). 
74. The technology is similar to the “electric eye,” which can 
automatically open a door when someone approaches, or keep an elevator or 
subway door from closing when there is a passenger in the way. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
76. The Clean Water Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
require plants to operate at control levels achievable by the industry’s best-
controlled plant. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012); EPA v. 
Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1980) (holding that economic 
considerations are inappropriate factors in setting Best Practicable 
Technology standards); Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that Best Available Technology standards should be set at the level 
an optimal plant can achieve); Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 
477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration could set standards that put a company out of business, if it 
is deemed necessary to protect the health and safety of the company’s 
workers). 
77. Driesen, supra note 29, at 8. 
 
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. 
Donovan, the Supreme Court addressed an industry claim 
that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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Within the Clean Air Act, Congress has set different control 
technology standards that vary according to the quality of 
ambient air.78 For areas in which air quality is already 
acceptable, Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 
standards impose a requirement, known as Best Available 
Control Technology (BACT), which subjects new sources of 
pollution to the best control technology that is economically 
feasible—”the maximum degree of reduction . . . which the 
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
 
(OSHA) must assure that the cost of standards for toxic 
pollutants in the workplace bear a reasonable relationship 
to the benefits such a standard provides. The Court rejected 
the argument. The statutory provision at issue in the case 
required OSHA to set the standard which most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity . 
. . . The Court concluded that Congress had already 
considered cost and decided to put the health and safety of 
workers above all other considerations, save that of 
feasibility. The Court, relying upon a dictionary definition, 
defined feasibility in terms of what one is capable of doing. 
 
Id. 
78. Commentators either see gradations in the degree of control 
required, often discernible by analyzing the superlatives which Congress 
used, or are guided by the tense of the verbs chosen by Congress. See Id. at 
22. 
 
Congress signals this less demanding approach to 
technology-based regulation by leaving superlative words 
like best, maximum, or lowest out of the statutory provision 
or by qualifying the superlatives to diminish their force. A 
good example of the absence of superlatives comes from the 
Clean Air Act, which requires states to apply limits 
achievable through application of reasonably available 
control technology to major stationary sources in areas not 
meeting air quality standards. The provisions for best 
practicable technology effluent limits offers a good example 
of qualification usually leading to laxer standards. 
 
Id. at 14 n.77 (“Congress sometimes clearly indicates a technology-forcing 
intent through employment of the future tense in articulating the feasibility 
principle.”). If either of these approaches is accepted, they could be equally 
applied to determining whether the statute should be viewed as technology-
static or technology-dynamic. 
23
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account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and 
other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through 
application of . . . available methods . . . including . . . 
innovative fuel combustion techniques . . . .”79 For areas in 
which air quality is not acceptable, the standard requires that 
proposed new sources meet a lowest achievable emission rate. 
 
The term lowest achievable emission rate 
[(LAER)], [which] means for any source, the rate 
of emission which reflects—(A) the most 
stringent emission limitation which is contained 
in the implementation plan of any State for such 
class or category of source, unless the owner or 
operator of the proposed source demonstrates 
that such limitations are not achievable, or (B) 
the most stringent emission limitation which is 
achieved in practice by such class or category of 
source, whichever is more stringent.80 
 
The PSD requirements “are designed to ensure that the air 
quality in attainment areas or areas that are already ‘clean’ 
will not degrade.”81 
In construing EPA’s authority to review a state agency’s 
determination, the Supreme Court held that the statute 
required consideration of costs in determining BACT, noting 
that the statute’s purpose included “to insure that economic 
growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation 
of existing clean air resources.”82 
The Supreme Court has observed that compliance with 
environmental laws is always possible—shutting down a plant 
reduces emissions to zero (by any measure, however precise).83 
 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012). 
80. Id. § 7501(3). 
81. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv. v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 470 (2004). 
82. Id. at 485; see 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3). Although the majority and 
minority both agreed on the definition of BACT, they disagreed on whether 
the state had reached a rational conclusion. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv., 
540 U.S. at 502-18. 
83. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 n.14 (1976). accord, AFL-
CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[T]he most certain way to 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/1
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This does not translate into an inflexible requirement that 
environmental laws be interpreted as technology-dynamic; 
however, when coupled with a standard that is set based on a 
perception of significant risk of public harm, it is a powerful 
argument in that direction. 
Taken together, environmental laws, unlike speeding 
prosecutions, appear to be ones that should be viewed as 
technology-dynamic in making determinations of violations of 
environmental standards. 
Several differences in the genesis and purpose of these two 
categories of law justify this distinction. Using the Clean Air 
Act as an example, note the following distinctions. 
1. In enacting the Clean Air Act,84 Congress made the 
following finding. 
 
[T]hat the growth in the amount and complexity 
of air pollution brought about by urbanization, 
industrial development, and the increasing use of 
motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers 
to the public health and welfare, including injury 
to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to 
and the deterioration of property, and hazards to 
air and ground transportation.85 
 
Congress further stated that one of the purposes of the law was 
“to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and 
the productive capacity of its population.”86 At least some 
members of Congress believed that most pollutants cause some 
harm at any level.87 
Therefore, an important public interest, which is 
 
eliminate industrial hazards is to eliminate industry."). These observations 
must assume that other laws, such as the Workers Notification Act, have 
already been complied with—otherwise, it might be unlawful to shut down a 
plant without prior notice. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (2012). 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
85. Id. § 7401(a)(2). 
86. Id. § 7401(b)(1). 
87. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 18,463-64 (1977) (statement of Sen. 
Edmund Muskie). 
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established by specific scientific evidence and which would be 
furthered by more stringent enforcement, is involved. In 
contrast, although excessive speed is certainly dangerous, it is 
hard to defend particular speed limits as anything but 
arbitrary. For example, a hypothetical speed limit of twenty-
five mph was probably set at that level not because twenty-six 
mph would be too fast, while twenty-four mph would be too 
slow but because all speed limits are set at speeds ending in “5” 
or “0” (and thirty mph was thought too fast). 
2. Congress has provided guidance suggesting that it 
wanted to err on the side of control: in enacting the Clean Air 
Act, Congress declared that its purposes included “initiat[ing] 
and accelerat[ing] a national research and development 
program to achieve the prevention and control of air 
pollution.”88 Given its findings as to the importance of pollution 
control and the adverse effects of even small amounts of 
pollution, this bias seems rational. On the other hand, it would 
be hard to justify the argument that a small deviation from a 
speed limit would have an adverse effect. As the cases 
described above appear to recognize, traveling even five or ten 
miles above the speed limit, by itself, is not viewed as a serious 
offense.89 Given the comparative lack of precision of automobile 
speedometers, it is unimaginable that a prosecution for 
traveling at 30.1 mph in a 30 mph zone would succeed. 
3. The determination of environmental standards is subject 
to an explicit statutory safety net. Although subject to 
controversy as to its application from its inception,90 the Clean 
Air Act, as well as most environmental statutes, requires a 
cost/benefit analysis in setting standards. As long as a 
cost/benefit analysis is made, any changes in measurement 
technology that result in stricter standards will be balanced 
against costs of the more stringent standard. Thus, an 
 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2) (2012). 
89. See United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 595 n.13 (4th Cir. 2012). 
90. See C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 235, 235 (1998) (“For years, one of the most vigorously 
debated issues in regulatory reform is whether the Clean Air Act . . . should 
be amended to require the Environmental Protection Agency . . . to consider 
costs and benefits in setting ambient air quality standards.”). See generally 
Stephen Fotis, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 127 (1985). 
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accountable agency, after public notice, will be making a 
decision on the record and subject to judicial review. This 
process overcomes the objections to private technology-made 
law. 
The conclusion that environmental laws should be 
interpreted as technology-dynamic, comports with notions of 
fairness and, even, with the right to confront one’s accusers. 
Environmental laws principally apply to corporations with 
manufacturing facilities. Unlike the typical motorist, 
corporations with manufacturing facilities are generally well 
positioned to install their own monitoring equipment and to 
check the accuracy of any findings regarding alleged violations. 
They are also well positioned to monitor proposed legislative or 
administrative changes and present their views as to the 
appropriate level of precision in determining violations. Thus, 
the elements of unfairness and unequal access to exculpatory 
data which are argued, in a purely visceral way, in favor of a 
technology-static approach to speeding laws, argue at the same 
basic level in favor of a technology-dynamic approach to 
environmental laws. 
 
V. Principled Approach to the Problem 
 
As noted above, there are two options available for 
interpreting laws. First, there is a technology-static approach, 
interpreting the law’s meaning and effect using the technology 
available at the time the law was created. Second, there is a 
technology-dynamic approach, interpreting the law’s meaning 
and effect using the technology available at the time the law is 
being applied, in effect allowing inventors to rewrite law. 
The approach to the problem depends on whether the law 
in question is already in effect or is under consideration. The 
simpler case is that of a pending proposal for future legislation. 
 
A. Future Legislation 
 
Once the problem of interpretation created by advances in 
measurement technology has been recognized, it can be 
addressed legislatively. Future legislation should therefore 
explicitly recognize the areas in which technological 
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development is likely to have an effect on the meaning and 
enforcement of the law.91 There are fundamentally two choices: 
declare that the law is to be enforced according to the 
capabilities as of the date of enactment, or that it is to be 
enforced according to the best measurement technology 
available at the time of enforcement. Environmental laws 
provide examples of legislation where Congress has indicated 
that post-enactment technological advances should be 
considered.92 Note that this is not the same as the technology-
forcing aspect of the environmental laws discussed above. 
Those statutes were designed to encourage use of the most 
current control technology. It is a different matter—and a 
separate legislative determination—to decide whether also to 
encourage use of the most current detection technology. 
 
B. Existing Legislation 
 
This leaves the much more difficult problem of existing 
legislation. Where the legislature has declared a policy (as for 
example the Clean Air Act), that policy should be analyzed to 
determine whether it leads clearly to one approach or the 
other. However, even in cases where there is legislative history, 
it will not necessarily be specific to the point at issue and even 
if on point will not necessarily be consistent and unambiguous 
or beyond dispute.93 
Where the legislature has been silent, the above two 
examples suggest factors which should be considered in 
determining which approach is appropriate: 
 1. In situations where life is at stake and the outcome will 
be affected by the precision of a measurement, the law should 
be interpreted using the most current available technology—it 
should be technology-dynamic. This is the case with respect to 
environmental laws and is not the case with respect to speed 
 
91. This is not a radical suggestion. Congress has taken comparable 
action in indexing tax brackets to account for future inflation. 
92. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
93. See generally Mont. Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(observing that when legislative history contains conflicting, inconclusive 
views, the court must divine the intent of Congress from the overall purpose 
of the statute). 
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limits 
2. In situations where the state of mind of an individual is 
a critical element, especially where the detection equipment 
available to one party is less precise than that available to the 
other, interpretation should not take into account post-
enactment technology unless the individual has done so—it 
should be technology-static. (Speed cameras should not be more 
precise than vehicle speedometers, but it is acceptable for the 
EPA to use modern detection equipment that is also available 
to the industry being regulated.) 
3. In situations where a law is the result of a cost-benefit 
analysis, the law should be frozen at the level of technology at 
enactment—it should be technology-static. To employ a more 
stringent standard upsets the cost-benefit analysis. While the 
environmental example might superficially seem to the 
contrary, it is not. Congress had made the determination that 
very low levels were the goal, and provided, through delegation 
to administrative agencies, the power to consider costs and 
benefits under appropriate circumstances. 
4. Counter intuitively, the argument in favor of tightening 
standards as technology improves detection is stronger under 
laws that set less precise standards. Use of an imprecise or 
variable standard, as in the case of the environmental laws 
discussed above, suggests that the legislature was aware of, 
though perhaps not in those terms, the possibility of future 
improvements in detection technology and did not want to tie 
the law to contemporary limits. On the other hand, when a 
legislature uses a term such as “thirty miles per hour,” it shows 
no such awareness that the term may have an imprecise or 
potentially changing meaning. 
29
